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Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties of the different 
procedures laid down in the comitology decision, i.e., the European Council's decision 
on procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. 
Furthermore, it addresses the question of how the balance of power is determined by 
this decision. 
I. Introduction 
In its decision of July 13, 1987 the Council laid down procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission [see European Council (1987)]. 
Articles 2 and 3 of the so-called "comitology" decision officially established advisory 
committees, management committees, and regulatory committees. The committees, 
which are bodies of representatives (civil servants) from the member states, consult, but 
also supervise, the Commission's execution of legal acts. The principal difference be- 
tween the advisory committee and the other two committees i  that the management 
and the regulatory committees can block a measure proposed by the Commission. 
While not having a decision making power of their own, the latter committees act as 
gatekeepers. If they are in disagreement to the Commission's position, the Council will 
take up the matter and may overrule or just invalidate the Commission's decision. The 
generally accepted view is that there is the following hierarchical ordering with respect 
to the restrictiveness of the three procedures: the regulatory committee over the man- 
agement committee, and the management committee over the advisory committee. It is 
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worthwhile to note that the European Parliament does not play any role in the imple- 
mentation phase of legal acts in the Union. 
Although advisory committees, management committees, and regulatory committees 
have become an integral part of the European institutional structure, there is surpris- 
ingly little research about the role of such committees to be found in constitutional law 
and economics. Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties 
of the different procedures laid down in the comitology decision, outlines a concept of 
power, and asks how the balance of power is determined by this decision. 1As for the 
concept of power developed in this paper, it should be mentioned that the degree of 
power is determined not only by looking at the restrictions imposed by the procedural 
rules, i.e., the structure of decision rights, but also by recognizing the way in which 
players are restricted by their opponents' preferences. Whereas traditional power con- 
cepts used in economics are an outgrowth of cooperative game theory, the concept we 
use is based on non-cooperative games. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we describe policymaking in the 
European Union and point to ways in which the Council tries to restrict he power of 
the Commission in implementing European policies. In Section III we analyze current 
decision making procedures using a model in which the Commission may select a policy 
that is subject o review by a committee of representatives of the member states and the 
Council. Section IV examines the power of the Commission and of the Council under 
the different procedures. In Section V we present our main conclusions. 
II. Implementation Procedures 
In delegating implementing decisions to the Commission, the Council has to take 
account of the fact that the Commission already plays an important role in the legisla- 
tive process. In all current legislative procedures of the European Union (EU), the 
Commission has the exclusive power of initiative. 2To prevent he Commission from 
becoming too powerful by having unrestricted iscretion at the implementation stage, 
the Council delegates some of its implementing powers to the Commission under the 
condition that specific decision making procedures have to be used. Although these 
procedures vary across different European legal acts, three different ypes can be dis- 
tinguished, partly based on the comitology decision [see Kapteyn and VerLoren van 
Themaat (1990), pp. 240-247]. The first type is called the advisory committee procedure, in 
which a committee of representatives of the member states gives its opinion on a draft 
measure of the Commission. The Commission has to take this advice into account and 
is obliged to inform the committee of representatives about the way in which the 
committee's advice has affected its final policy choice. This procedure will not be 
analyzed further in this paper as it does not grant any decision making power to players 
other than the Commission. 
1To the best of our knowledge, our contribution can be seen as one of the first attempts to analyze the implemen- 
tation procedures that govern policymaking in the European Union using an economic approach and, more specifi- 
cally, the tools of non-cooperative game theory. 
2See Cooter and Drexl (1994), Tsebelis (1994), and Steunenberg (1994b) for more detailed analyses of the 
legislative procedures in the European Union. Note that Tsebelis assumes that the European Parliament had condi- 
tional agenda-setting power under the cooperation procedure. However, this assumption is not in accordance with the 
Treaty or the way in which the Treaty is applied in practice, as Moser (1995) explains. 
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The second type is the management committee procedure. In this procedure the Com- 
mission is assisted by a committee of representatives of  the member states, which gives 
its opinion on the Commission proposal by qualified majority. 3 If the committee of  
representatives agrees with the Commission proposal or remains divided, the Commis- 
sion proposal will be implemented. If the committee of representatives adopts a differ- 
ent view, the Commission reports its proposal to the Council. 4 The Council may only 
take a decision that deviates from the Commission proposal by qualified majority. If the 
Council agrees with or does not respond to the proposal, the Commission is allowed to 
implement its proposal. 
The third procedure is the regulatory committee procedure. In this procedure, the Com- 
mission submits its proposal again to a committee of representatives. This committee of 
representatives has to give its opinion on the Commission proposal by qualified majority 
rule. If the committee of representatives proposes a policy that deviates from the Com- 
mission proposal, or when the committee of representatives does not reach a decision, 
the Commission has to submit its proposal to the Council. A divided committee of 
representatives in this procedure means that the Commission proposal has to be sub- 
mitted to the Council. With regard to decision making in the Council, two variants of 
this procedure can be distinguished. In both variants, the Council may amend the 
Commission proposal by qualified majority. In variant (a), which will be called the 
amendment procedure, the Commission proposal will be adopted if the Council does not 
decide otherwise. A Council decision that deviates from the Commission proposal has 
to be based on a qualified majority. In variant (b), the Council additionally may veto the 
Commission proposal by a simple majority. This variant of the regulatory committee 
procedure is known as the "contrefilet" procedure. In this paper this version will be 
called the veto procedure. 
Under the management committee procedure, the Commission has been delegated 
the authority to determine a new policy. The Council may deviate from this proposal 
only if the committee of  representatives gives a negative opinion on the Commission 
proposal. Under the regulatory committee procedure, only if the committee of repre- 
sentatives gives a positive opinion on the Commission proposal can it be implemented. 
In all other cases, the Council may set a different policy by a qualified majority or veto 
the Commission proposal. 
The main difference between the two variants of the regulatory committee proce- 
dure, i.e., the amendment and the veto procedure, is the voting procedure. In the 
amendment procedure, the Council can change the Commission proposal only if a 
qualified majority opts for a different point of view. If the Council fails to adopt a 
different view, the Commission proposal will be implemented. In the veto procedure, 
the Council is able to reject the Commission proposal by a simple majority in favor of 
the status quo ante, i.e., the situation where no policy will be implemented. In that case, 
the Council has to make a comparison between the Commission proposal and the status 
quo ante. If the Council prefers the Commission proposal to the status quo ante, it will not 
use its veto right. 
SAs provided for in Article 148(2) EC. 
4At this point two variants of the procedure can be distinguished which will not be discussed in this paper. In variant 
(a) the Commission may implement the measure if it is being discussed by the Council. In variant (b) this is not 
possible, and the implementation f the measure has to be deferred for a specific period of time. 
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III. Policymaking Under Different Arrangements 
Players, Preferences, and Decision-Making Procedures 
To analyze the extent to which the Commission is bound to the Council in selecting 
different policy measures, a model  will be used with three types of players: 
(i) the members of the Council, 
(ii) the members of the committee of state representatives, 5 and 
(iii) the Commission, which will be regarded as a unitary actor. 
(See Steunenberg [ 1994a] for a similar model  appl ied to policymaking in parl iamentary 
systems.)These players are assumed to decide on some regulatory issue, which can be 
represented by a one-dimensional outcome X. The preference of a player i over X is 
represented by a function U/= Ui(x), which defines single-peaked preferences. 6 The 
preference set of  a player i, that is, the set of points a player strictly prefers to some point 
x, is defined as 
~i(x) -{y~ XI Ui(y ) > Ui(x)}; 
a weak version of the preference set is ~ti(x), which is def ined as 
~ti(x) -{ye  XI U/(y) /> Ui(x),y * xe  X}. 
For a group of players, 7 S, these preference sets are defined as 
~s(X) -{ye  XI Ui(y) > Ui(x) for all i e  S}, 
and 
~ts(x ) = {y E X I U,(y) >1 Ui(x) for all i e S,y 4= x e X}. 
Furthermore,  player i's point  of indifference to a proposal x will be denoted as I(x). 
Decisions are assumed to be made sequentially. The sequence is based on the existing 
procedures that specify the order in which players are allowed to make a move. Players 
are assumed to have complete and perfect information. This assumption implies that 
the preferences of players, the structure of the game, and the fact that players behave 
in a rational way, are assumed to be common knowledge, while for every stage of  the 
game only one player is allowed to make a move. Second, we assume that none of the 
players prefers its decision to be overturned. This preference can be viewed as imposing 
some cost on a proposal that is not the final outcome of the decision making process. 
These costs are assumed to reduce the final payoff to a player. All of the implementat ion 
games we consider in the paper have a unique subgame perfect Nash equil ibrium, 
which we take to define the outcome of the implementat ion game. 
Qualif ied majority voting, which combines pecial majority voting and weighted ma- 
jority voting, play an important role in the EU decision-making process. Under  this rule, 
each voter may cast a specific number  of votes, and a special majority is required to 
5As indicated, the members  of  these committees of representatives are civil servants from the national administra- 
tions of  the member  states. Depending on the policy field involved, more than one sector specialist from the same 
member  state can be appointed to these committees. Furthermore, changes in appointments to these committees 
occur relatively infrequently. So, in our view, it is a prior/not clear that committee members have preferences identical 
to those of  the ministers in the Council. 
6Since players have single-peaked preferences along a single dimension, the well-known median voter theorem 
(Black 1987, p. 18) applies if a decision has to be made on the basis of  simple majority voting. 
VA group of players constitutes a voting body or, as it is called in the literature, a committee (cf. Black, 1987). In this 
respect, the Council and the committees of representatives are committees in the technical meaning. 
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FIG. 1. Qual i f ied major ity vot ing in a f ive-member  Council .  
adopt a proposal. This may lead to some complications, which can be il lustrated by a 
(hypothetical) f ive-member Council. In Figure 1, Li denotes the ideal point  of Council  
member  i, and Zi(x ) stands for this member 's  point  of indifference to the policy x. If, 
for instance, a two-thirds majority is needed to approve a proposal, while Council 
members have equivalent vote shares, member  2 or member  4 is important, since 
two-thirds of the ideal points in the Council  are found to the right or to the left of this 
member  including his or her own vote. So, if the initial proposal x satisfies x > L4, such 
as xl in the figure, a two-thirds majority strictly prefers an alternative proposal y = L 4 to 
the initial proposal xv Consequently, the Council  will approve this alternative proposal 
y. However, i f /~  ~< x ~< L 4, as il lustrated by ~ in the figure, the initial proposal divides 
the members of the Council. Some members prefer a move to the left, others to the 
right. But neither of them is able to form the required qualified majority against he 
initial proposal. In that case, the Council is not able to approve any new proposal, and 
x~ will be implemented. 
Under  qualified majority rule each voter does not have just one vote, but instead may 
cast a number  of votes that varies between voters. A decisive Council member,  such as 
member  2 or member  4 in the example, has to be defined in terms of the number  of 
each player's votes. Now, assume, without loss of generality, that x >i Lm, with L,~ as the 
ideal point  of the median Council member.  8 Given some distribution of Council  mem- 
bers along the policy dimension X, a Council  member  will be called the decisive quali- 
fied majority member,  Lr, if it finds to its left the ideal points of other Council  members 
whose vote shares constitute the smallest qualified majority, including its own vote 
share. This group of members, of which r is the rightmost member,  will be denoted as 
Sir ". If all members are allowed to propose amendments,  9 qualified majority voting yields 
the following outcome: 
Lr for x > L r 
Y= x forLr~> x~ > L m (1) 
If x> L,, the preference set of group ~,  Psi; (x), is non-empty, and the Council is able 
to amend the initial proposal to y = L,, which is the best proposal feasible to the 
members of  ~ .  If x <~ L,, P~(x)  = O, and the Council  is not able to form a qualified 
majority against he initial proposal x. In general, the Council  is not able to reach a 
decision for initial proposals that are found between its two decisive members. These 
proposals form the "blocking" set for Council  moves, which is def ined as 
SThe interested reader should be able to derive the results for x ~< L~ which contains trategically equivalent cases 
to the ones discussed in this paper. 
9We assume that the Council, or, in general, any committee (in the technical sense) uses a well-ordered agenda in 
the following sense: First, all proposed amendments are being collected and ordered according to their deviation from 
the initial proposal; second, each amendment is being compared with the initial proposal in a binary vote starting with 
the amendment that deviates most from the inidal proposal. 
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FIG. 2. Qualified majority voting in a five-member committee of representatives. 
M-  = {x I P~(x) = O and P~(x) = O}. 
Initial proposals that are an e lement of  this set, are invulnerable to amendments.  
Now we want to analyze the decision that has to be made by the committee of  
representatives. This committee of regulatory acts as a gatekeeper, but has no rights to 
amend the initial proposal. Therefore, it can choose only between the initial proposal 
x (by keeping its gates closed) and the amended proposal y (which it can expect to 
result from opening its gates). Using qualified majority rule, proposals may exist that 
divide the committee of  representatives: Neither the initial proposal, x, nor the pro- 
posed amended policy, y, will be preferred by a qualified majority in the committee. If
the initial proposal is selected in such a way that it makes the relevant decisive com- 
mittee member  indifferent between both proposals (i.e., x= C4(y ) or x= C2(y ) in Figure 
2), this player will not support proposal y, and the committee is not able to reach a 
decision. The proposals that will not lead to a committee decision are found in the 
so-called gatekeeper's "blocking" set. This set is def ined as 
c(y) ={xl G(y) <- x<. c,(y)}, 
with Ct(y) and C~(y) as the point  of indifference to y of the leftmost and the rightmost 
decisive qualified majority committee member,  respectively. For the f ive-member com- 
mittee in Figure 2, and a subsequent proposal y, this set is equivalent to the interval 
[C2(y), C4(y)]. If, for instance, the initial proposal is x = C2, the gatekeeping committee 
will be divided and cannot reach a decision. Depending on a specific EU decision- 
making procedure,  a divided committee may lead to either the implementat ion of the 
Commission policy or the submission of this proposal to the Council. 
Management Committee Procedure 
The management  committee procedure can be modeled as a game that consists of  
three stages. In the first stage the Commission proposes a new policy x. In the second 
stage the committee of representatives, acting as a gatekeeper, considers the policy 
proposed by the Commission. Only if the committee disagrees on the Commission pro- 
posal by qualified majority, is the Commission proposal submitted to the Council. In the 
third and last stage, the Council  considers the Commission proposal and may propose 
a different measure, y, by qualified majority. Let a be the Commission; c, i e {l, ~}, is the 
relevant decisive qualified majority member  of the committee of representatives, while 
l~ i e {l, r}, stands for the decisive qualified majority member  in the Council. The game 
tree for this procedure is given in Figure 3. TM 
To solve this game, we proceed by backward induction. In the last stage, the Council  
will consider the Commission proposal, x, and determine whether sufficient support 
1°Note that he endnodes are labelled with the outcomes in terms of the policy that is selected rather than with the 
individual payoffs. These payoffs, however, can be obtained by substituting the policy outcome into each player's utility 
function. For example, the policy x results in individual payoffs to the players equal to (U~(x), Ucl (x), Utl(x)). 
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FIG. 3. Game tree for  management  commit tee  procedure .  
exists to select a different policy, y, given x. The Commission proposal, x, forms the 
status quo post, which will be implemented if the Council does not respond. Assume, for 
simplicity, that the Commission has a "progressive" preference compared to the Coun- 
cil, i.e., A ~ Lm, so x 1> Lm. Consequently, we can restrict our attention to l~ as the 
relevant qualified majority member in the Council. The Council's response is now given 
by Equation 1. In the second stage, the committee of representatives has to determine 
whether or not it will accept he Commission proposal given the response of the Coun- 
cil. The committee keeps its gates closed when 
(i) a qualified majority of the committee weakly prefers x to y = L~. 11 
(ii) the committee cannot form a qualified majority, or 
(iii) the Council cannot amend the Commission proposal and therefore will accept x. 
If one of these conditions is satisfied, committee behavior will not lead to the submis- 
sion of the Commission proposal to the Council. t2 Knowing this response, the Com- 
mission will select its best proposal such that one of these conditions is satisfied. This 
proposal will be the equilibrium outcome. 
PROPOSITION 1: Under the management committee procedure, the eguilibrium policy x is the 
Commission's preferred point in the interval [Lm, max[Lr, Cr(L,)} ]. 
As this result indicates, the equilibrium policy is found between the median Council 
member (which is used as the leftmost policy position in our analysis) and the decisive 
qualified majority member of the Council. A more extreme preference of the rightmost 
decisive committee member, Cr, increases the number of potential equilibrium policies. 
If C F > L r, the Commission may select a policy that the decisive committee member 
(weakly) prefers to the outcome of Council decision making (i.e., y = Lr). The most 
extreme policy the Commission may choose is the committee member's point of  indif- 
ference to the Council policy, CT(Lr). 
llFormally, R~ (Lr) :~ O, i ¢ {l, •, which implies that proposals exist that are preferred to the outcome of Council 
decision making. In a qualified majority vote, the Council will eventually set a policy equivalent to the ideal point of 
its decisive member, L,. (see Equation 1). Furthermore, recall that ~ is a qualified majority coalition of gatekeeping 
committee members with i as its leftmost or rightmost member. Note that the committee might be able to form a 
qualified majority in favor o fy  in two cases: 
(a) ff Cr < L .  so y > C. or 
(b) i fC t>L  . soy< C~ 
12Formally, the committee will keep its gates closed when the Commission proposal, x. is an element of the following 
set: R~(I~) u G(Lr) U M:i ~ {l, r}. 
13See the Appendix for a proof of all results. 
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Regulatory Committee Procedure: Amendment 
The main difference between the management and the regulatory committee proce- 
dure is that the Commission proposal has to be submitted to the Council if the com- 
mittee of representatives does not reach a decision. So the amendment  version of the 
regulatory committee procedure can be modeled as the management  committee pro- 
cedure with the following modification: Only if a qualified majority in the committee 
weakly prefers the proposal of the Commission, x, to the Council  measure, y, will it keep 
its gates closed. This implies that the committee will accept the Commission proposal 
(i) when a qualified majority of committee members weakly prefers x to y, or 
(ii) when the Council  cannot amend the Commission proposal and therefore will 
accept x. 
The committee will present a positive opinion on the Commission proposal if one of 
these condit ions is satisfied. TM Knowing this response of the committee, the Commission 
selects its best proposal such that one of these condit ions is satisfied. 
PROPOSITION 2: Under the amendment version of the regulatory committee procedure, the equilib- 
rium policy x is the Commission's preferred point in the interval [Lm, max{Lr, CI(Lr)} ]. 
In comparison to the management  committee procedure, the interval from which the 
Commission may select its best proposal is more restrictive: Since, by definition, Ct < C,, 
so Ct(Lr) < Cr(Lr). This is the result of the fact that the Commission has to submit its 
proposal to the Council  if the committee does not reach a decision. Consequently, the 
Commission can no longer propose a policy that leads to a divided committee. Only 
when a qualified majority in the committee prefers the Commission proposal to the 
Council policy, will it be able to present a positive opinion. This requirement increases 
the involvement of the Council  and, at the same time, decreases the extent o which the 
Commission is able to formulate a new public policy that differs from the preferences 
of Council members. 
Regulatory Committee Procedure: Veto 
The veto version of the regulatory majority procedure provides the Council with an 
addit ional opportunity: Besides amending the Commission proposal, the Council  may 
also reject the new proposal by simple majority. This procedure will be modeled in the 
following way: After the committee's decision in the second stage, the Council first 
decides whether or not it will veto the Commission proposal before it considers amend- 
ments. If  the Council  vetoes the Commission proposal, the status quo ante, q, will again 
come into effect. The game tree 1~ of this game is given in Figure 4. 
In the last stage, the Council  will consider the Commission proposal and select y = Lr 
if x > L,, or y = x if x <~ L r (see Equation 1). The median Council  member,  l,~, will take 
this response into account and use its veto only if it prefers q to either x or L,, i.e., if x 
or  L r are not an element of  the median Council  member 's  preference set Rl~,(q). Since 
L,~ ~< L,, a veto will be issued when q < L r < x, or when q < x ~< L,. However, if x or L r 
14Formally, the committee will keep its gates closed when the Commission makes a proposal that is an element of 
Rs$:(Lr) u M,  i ~ {l, r}. That is, the proposal should be an element of the committee's qualified majority preference set 
or the blocking set for Council moves. 
15See footnote 10 for the labeling of the endnodes. 
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FIG. 4. Game tree for the veto version of the regulatory committee procedure. 
is an element of Rtm(q ), the median Council member  will not use its veto power. 16 In the 
second stage, the committee has to decide whether or not to keep its gates closed, i.e., 
give a negative opinion on the Commission proposal. It will keep its gates closed when 
it weakly prefers x to either q or y = L,, or when the Council cannot amend the 
Commission proposal and therefore has to accept x, while the proposal is not being 
vetoed. 17 Knowing this response of the gatekeeping committee, the Commission selects 
its preferred proposal, given that this proposal will not need to be submitted to the 
Council. 
PROPOSITION 3: Under the veto version of the regulatory committee procedure, the equilibrium policy 
x is the Commission's preferred point in the interval 
(i) [Era, max{L r, Cl(Lr)l] for q >I Lr, or 
(ii) [Lm, max[q, Cl(q)/l forL m < q < Lr .18 
Note that for q I> L,, the equilibrium outcome of the veto version is equivalent to the 
amendment version of the regulatory committee procedure. Only when q < L,, does the 
additional veto of the Council play a role. While the Council cannot amend proposals 
that are found between its median member, l,,, and its decisive qualified majority 
member, It, it can object against hose proposals that are not veto proof. This additional 
power of  the Council reduces the set of proposals from which the Commission may 
select its policy. 19 Consequently, the Commission loses some of its power, that is, the 
ability to set different common policies. 
IV. The  Balance of  Power Under  Di f ferent  Institutional Arrangements 
The power of the European Commission (or of any other player in the implementation 
game) to set new policies that coincide with its own preferences i affected by the rules 
of the decision-making game (committee procedures) as well as by the preferences of 
the other players. Although ideally one might want to know how severely players are re- 
16Note that, in those cases, the response of the Council is as ffdlows: It will propose y= L r if x > L, and q/> L,, or 
y = x i fx  <~ L, and q ~> x. 
17Formally, the Commission proposal will not be submitted to the Council when x • Rs$:(Lr) u [Mn Rtm (q)] for 
q> L. or xe  Rsf (q) w [mn R~= (q)] for q< L,. 
lSFor q < L,~, the following solution can be derived: The equilibrium policy x is the Commission's preferred point 
in the interval 
• [L~ max{Q(q), L..(q)}] for L.,(q) < L. or 
• [L~, max{Ct(Lr), L,}] for L~(q) >1 L .  
mNote that G(q) < Q(L~) since q < L,. 
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stricted in implementing their preferred policy, such a measure would require strong 
assumptions about the specific preferences of each player. Therefore, we will approxi- 
mate the power of a player by measuring how close the outcomes under a given pro- 
cedure, given different constellations of preferences, come to the player's ideal point. 
Clearly, a player is worse off the further away from his ideal point is the outcome of 
an implementation game. Because the outcome of an implementation game depends 
on the procedure used as well as on the players' preferences, and because a procedure 
is used for a multitude of decisions about topics on which the players' preferences may 
vary, we will use the mean or expected istance between a player's ideal point and the 
outcomes of implementation games as a measure to illustrate the effect of the commit- 
tee procedures on the players' power. 
Additionally, we will consider afictitious (or dummy) player (denoted by d) who also 
has preferences over the policy space that meet the same requirements a the prefer- 
ences of the players, but who does not affect he outcome of the implementation game. 
This dummy player may be said to have no power. 
To calculate the mean distance between the outcomes and the ideal points of the 
players under different procedures, we make the following simplifying assumptions: 
• The possible ideal points of the players and the possible status quo ante are equidistant 
on the policy dimension, and the minimal distance between two possible ideal points 
is the same for all preference constellations. This minimal distance between two 
different ideal points is denoted by ~. 
• The ideal points of all decisive players (i.e., the Commission, the leftmost decisive 
member and the rightmost decisive member of the Committee, and the median 
member and the rightmost decisive member of the Council) as well as the ideal point 
of the dummy player may but need not differ from each other and may but need not 
differ from the status quo ante. 
• All preferences that satisfy A >! Lm, z° C l <~ C,, Lm <~ Lrand q i> Lm are equally probable. 
It is important to stress that this last assumption does not mean that the ideal points 
of the players who determine the outcome of the implementation game are distributed 
uniformly on a closed interval. Since we restrict our analysis to cases where the ideal 
point of the Commission as well as the status quo anteare not to the left of the ideal point 
of the median Council member, and because the ideal points of the rightmost, the 
median and the leftmost decisive member of a committee must not be in descending 
order, the assumption of equal likelihood of preference constellations that satisfy the 
above conditions i different from the assumption of equal probability of every possible 
ideal point for each player. This difference, however, does not imply any bias, because 
without he restrictions A >i L m and q >>- L m the outcomes of the policy game would be 
strategically equivalent to those dealt with in the paper (see also note 20). 
The assumption of equal ikelihood of all feasible preference constellations, however, 
excludes correlated preferences of individual players (except of the restrictions of our 
analysis to cases where the ideal point of the Commission as well as the status quo ante 
is not less than the ideal point of the median Council member). In particular, we 
e°This restriction allows to use only Propositions 1 through 3 to determine the outcome of a specific procedure 
given a specific constellation of  preferences. It is important to note that this restriction does not imply any bias, because 
with A < L m the policy games would be strategically equivalent to the games with A ~> L m. This is to say that without this 
restriction, the number  of possible preference constellations would increase, but the mean distances would remain the 
same, as the outcomes just mirror  the outcomes given by Propositions 1 through 3. 
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TABLE 1. Mean distance between outcome and prefer red pol icy under  d i f ferent  pro-  
cedures  
Procedure 2: Procedure 3: 
Procedure 1: regulatory committee regulatory committee 
management committee amendment veto 
N A 1 Ai, n A d A a Aim A d A a Aim A d 
2 0.11 0.75 0.86 0.24 0.62 0.86 0.35 0.51 0.86 
3 0.15 1.12 1.19 0.34 0.93 1.18 0.48 0.79 1.17 
4 0.19 1.49 1.51 0.43 1.25 1.49 0.61 1.06 1.48 
5 0.22 1.86 1.83 0.52 1.56 1.79 0.74 1.34 1.78 
6 0.26 2.23 2.15 0.62 1.86 2.10 0.88 1.61 2.08 
7 0.29 2.59 2.46 0.71 2.17 2.40 1.01 1.87 2.38 
abstract from cases where the group of "truly European players" (i.e., Parliament and 
Commission), on the one hand, and the group of"national players" (Council members 
and state representatives forming the committees), on the other hand, are more likely 
to have similar preferences within the group and divergent preferences between 
groups, zl 
Given these simplifying assumptions, the number of feasible preference constella- 
tions (including possible status quo ante) is finite and denoted by N. This number 
depends on the length of the interval over which the ideal points are distributed. For 
example, given an interval of length 3~, there are four possible values that the ideal 
points may take, viz. some arbitrary number x, x + ~, x + 2~, and x + 3~. In general, if the 
ideal points are distributed over an interval of length ruS, then the number of possible 
values that an ideal point may take is given by n + 1. 
Let ~j(p), j = 1..N, be the equilibrium outcome for a specific implementation proce- 
dure, given a preference constellation j, as defined by Propositions 1 through 3. We can 
define the mean distance between the outcomes of the policy implementation game 
and the ideal point of a player i by 
N 
Z I ~j(p) - IJl 
j=l 
Ai(P) = N 
with F being the ideal point of player i in preference constellation j. 
Normalizing ~ to one, we get the following mean distances and standard deviations 
(summarized in Table 1) for the difference among the outcomes of the different 
procedures and the ideal points of the Commission, the median number of  the Council, 
21As for the ideal points of the rightmost, median, and leftmost decisive members of the committee, Parliament, or 
the Council, one could imagine the following way of modeling the distribution of these ideal points: If we assume that 
the preferences of the m individual members are distributed uniformly on a closed interval, then the probability of the 
ideal point of the decisive member being at some point x is given by the probability that the ideal points of 
n < rn members are smaller than x and the ideal points of m - n members are greater or equal to x, where n or m - n 
is the number of members who are required to vote for or against a proposal. This probability can easily be calculated 
using the binomial distribution. In this case the distribution of the ideal points of the decisive members may depend on 
the size of the body. 
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and the dummy player, respectively. 22 The table gives the length of the interval over 
which the ideal points can be distributed (n) and the mean distances for the Commis- 
sion (a), the median member of the council (l,n) and the dummy player (d) for all 
procedures and different n. An increase in n can be interpreted as a wider range over 
which individual preferences may diverge. In other words, the greater n, the greater is 
the potential for disagreement. 
From this table, several implications can be drawn. 23 
• For all n, the three "comitology" procedures convey a different amount of power to 
the Commission. The mean distance between the outcomes of the implementation 
games and the preferred policy of the Commission is smallest in the management 
committee procedure and largest in the regulatory committee veto procedure. Given 
these results, the Commission's preference over different procedures can be written 
as: (management committee) > (regulatory committee: amendment) ~ (regulatory 
committee: veto) 
• The difference in Commission power between the management procedure and the 
amendment version of the regulatory committee procedure results from the fact that 
both procedures differ with respect to the consequences of an undecided committee. 
Whereas in the management committee procedure a qualified majority is required to 
open the gates, in the regulatory committee procedure the committee must be able 
to form a qualified majority for keeping the gates closed. The difference in Commis- 
sion power between the veto version and the amendment version of the regulatory 
committee procedure results from the fact that the Commission is restricted in the 
veto version by the possibility that the Council may veto the Commission proposal in 
favor of the status quo ante. 
• For all n, the three "comitology" procedures also confer a different amount of power 
on the Council. The mean distance is smallest for the veto version of the regulatory 
procedure and is largest for the management procedure. Given these results, the 
Council's preference over different procedures can be written as: (management 
committee) ~ (regulatory committee: amendment) ~ (regulatory committee: veto) 
• Surprisingly, from a minimum range of potential disagreement (n = 4) in the man- 
agement committee procedure, the median Council member performs worse than a 
completely powerless dummy player. This counter-intuitive r sult is due to the fact 
that the median Council member in the management committee procedure does not 
affect the outcome directly. Due to our assumption that a/> Lm, the restriction that 
the policy chosen will be in [Lm, max{L, Cr(Lr)}] does not imply any binding restric- 
tion imposed by the median Council member. While the preferences of the dummy 
player may vary freely over all possible preference constellations, the preferences of 
22Note that we can interpret the values defined with respect to the ideal point of the median member of the Council 
as a useful measure for the power of the Council even if the identity of the median member is not the same for all 
possible preference constellations. Suppose that without he delegation of implementation power to the Commission, 
followed by the use of one of the comitology procedures, the Council itself would decide with simple majority on the 
policy to be implemented. In this case, the ideal point of the median member of the Council determines the outcome. 
Thus, regardless of the identity of the median member, the mean distance captures the difference between the best 
outcome that a Council not delegating implementation power could guarantee and the outcome that results from the 
use of a specific procedure. 
~aWe want to stress that neither the absolute nor the relative change in the respective power should be generalized, 
because the figures are highly sensitive to the assumption about he probability of different preference constellations. 
Thus, we want to consider only implications drawn from the direction of change. 
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the median Council member must always atisfy Lt <~ L m <~ L r. This restriction on the 
range of ideal points for the median Council member implies the bias against lm in 
cases where he has no effect on the actual outcome, as compared to a powerless 
player without any restriction on his ideal points. This bias becomes more effective if 
the range of possible ideal points increases. 
• The dummy player represents an agent who, though not involved in the decision- 
making process, is affected by its outcome. Under the assumption that the members 
of the European Parliament have preferences that satisfy the same assumptions a the 
preferences of those players actively involved in the implementation game, the figures 
given for the dummy player can be interpreted as representing the position of the 
European Parliament (represented by the ideal point of one of its members). Even if 
the dummy player is not involved in the game, at least for a sufficiently large potential 
for disagreement (n/> 3) he is better off under the regulatory committee procedures. 
For still larger potential for disagreement (n i> 4), the veto version is better for the 
dummy player than the amendment version. This can be interpreted as a result of 
actual outcomes being less biased in favor of the Commission's ideal point, as the 
figures for the Commission show. Being a dummy player under current implemen- 
tation procedures, the European Parliament clearly has an incentive to change these 
procedures and become more closely involved in these decision-making processes. 
One way to change procedures i to propose and introduce a formal role for Parlia- 
ment at the implementation stage. Another possibility is that Parliament, which may 
review the policy initiatives of the Commission (and dismiss the Commission with a 
two-thirds majority vote), uses its current powers to affect common policies. 
V. Conc lus ion 
We have shown how the results of a policy-setting ame, by which the outcomes of 
legislative processes are put into effect, depend on the procedures used for the imple- 
mentation of a policy. We have analyzed three prominent procedures laid down in the 
comitology decision. To compare these procedures, we have tried to focus on the power 
of the Commission in setting the policy that best suits its own interests. Our main 
findings are that besides the advisory committee procedure, which does not restrict 
the Commission in the slightest wayZ4--the management committee procedure restricts 
the Commission the least. Under this implementation procedure, the Commission has 
the most power in setting public policies. The Council would rank the current imple- 
mentation procedure differently, that is, it would prefer the veto variant of the regula- 
tory committee procedure most. 
Furthermore, one could ask how the balance of power would change if the Parlia- 
ment were involved at the implementation stage. Presumably, an involvement of Par- 
liament would reduce the power of the Commission to set a policy according to its own 
preferences. This effect may depend crucially on the extent o which the preferences of
the Commission and of the members of Parliament are correlated. Possibly, both the 
Commission and the European Parliament may prefer an institutional arrangement, 
where the role of Parliament is more to restrict he influence of the Council and the 
committees rather than to actively propose or amend policies itself. 
We have presented a positive analysis of existing procedures governing the policy 
Z4This result has not been proved in the paper, but given the description of the advisory committee procedure from 
Section III, it should be straightforward. 
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implementation stage, and it seems necessary to stress that "more"  or "less" power for 
the Commission does not necessarily coincide with "better" or "worse" decision- 
making procedures. The latter judgment has to be kept for a normative analysis. For this 
kind of  analysis, of  course, one needs a normative criterion to judge the quality of 
different procedures in terms of their outcomes. Such a criterion would have to ac- 
knowledge that none of the institutional players should be seen as an end in itself, but 
rather that all of them are intended to serve the interest of the European citizens. Thus, 
the normative criterion would have to judge how well the preferences of the European 
citizens are represented in the policies that are selected at the European level. 
Quite naturally, one would expect that these preferences are mirrored in the com- 
position of the European Parliament, and thus, are best reflected in the preferences of  
the parliamentary players. Consequently, a decision procedure that does not allow for 
some influence of the Parliament seems, at first sight, to be worse than procedures 
where the outcome is affected by parliamentary players. This conclusion, however, rests 
on the assumption that the preferences of these parliamentary players in fact reflect the 
preferences of the citizens better than the preferences of other players. These prefer- 
ences are not completely exogenous, but depend on the way the members of the 
different bodies are appointed and on their responsibility to the electorate of the 
individual member states. If the interests of the European electorate are highly valued, 
then the European Parliament needs to play a more substantial role in the implemen- 
tation process. 25 On the other hand, if the interests of  the national electorate or the 
regions are regarded as important, particularly in a pursuit of European integration, the 
Council or an adapted voting body based on a regional representation of interest and 
not on proportionality, should be the player who is most likely to determine the out- 
come of an implementation process. 
An answer to the question of whether and how well the individual players' prefer- 
ences reflect the preferences of the citizens needs further institutional analysis. The 
extent o which the preferences of the electorate are represented by some of the players 
in the policy game does not convey much information, however, without knowing to 
what extent these players affect the outcome of this game. Our paper focused on the 
latter question, and can, thus, be regarded as one building block for an analysis of the 
democratic quality of a European institutional framework, or, in a broad sense, a 
European constitution. 
Appendix 
Notation 
The following notation is used in this paper: 
i player (a: Commission, d: dummy player, c: member of a committee of 
representatives, l: member of  the Council). 
il leftmost member of  a committee (in the technical sense, i.e., the Council or 
a committee of representatives), who finds to his right the ideal points of  
other members whose vote shares constitute a qualified majority, including 
its own vote share (i ~ {c, /}). 
~SWe will address this question in a companion paper, analyzing hypothetical procedures with parliamentary 
involvement. 
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im median member of  a committee in the above sense (i ~ {c, I}). 
ir rightmost member of a committee in the above sense, who finds to his left 
the ideal points of other members whose vote shares constitute a qualified 
majority, including his own vote share (i ~ {c, /}). 
q status quo ante. 
I player i's ideal point ( Ie  {A, L~, L,, C b C,, D}). 
I(q) player i's point of  indifference to q. 
P~ strict preference set of player i. 
R/ weak preference set of  player i. 
~7/ qualified majority coalition of members of a committee j of which i is the 
leftmost or rightmost member. 
~!i(P) outcome of procedure p given preference constellation j. 
minimum distance between two possible ideal points. 
n multiplier determining the interval ength over which the ideal points can 
be distributed in multiples of 8. 
N number of feasible preference constellations (including ideal points and 
status quo ante). 
Ai(p) mean distance between the outcomes of a policy implementation game 
defined by procedure p and the ideal point of player i. 
Proof of the Propositions 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Note that for x/> Lm, the set M is equivalent to [L,,, Lr]. For 
x <~ L,, the Council selects y = x, and the gatekeeper will not open its gates, since any 
other action will lead to a lower payoff. The Commission, with an ideal point A ~< L,, 
selects x = A. More interesting cases occur when the Council proposes y = L,, that is, if 
x > L,, Now, three cases need to be distinguished: 
(a) If Cr< L,  Cris the relevant decisive committee member, and Cr(Lr) < Cr< L,. R~ (Lr) 
is non-empty and equivalent to [ Cr(Lr), Lr]. However, for x >! Lm, Rs~: (Lr) --¢- M, and 
the gatekeeper will always keep its gates closed given the response of the Council. 
(b) If C t ~< Lr ~< C,, the committee opens its gates when x > Cr(Lr). Then, its decisive 
member r strictly prefers y to x. Only if x <~ Cr(Lr), and thus x e G(Lr), the gate- 
keeper cannot reach a decision and keeps its gates closed. Note that G(Lr) is 
equivalent to [Q(L~), Cr(L~)], with Ct(Lr) ~< L,, so M and G(Lr) have a non-empty 
intersection. 
(c) If C t > L,, C 1 is decisive. The committee keeps its gates closed either if x e R~ (L~), 
or x ~ G(L~). Since Rsf (L~) is equivalent to [L, Cl(Lr)], and G(L~) to [Q(Lr), C~(L,)], 
its union is [L,, Cr(L~)]. 
The Commission selects its best x such that the gatekeeper does not open its gates. The 
set of  points that satisfy this condition is equivalent to [Lm,/Jr] for Cr < L,, or [Lm, Cr(Lr) ] 
for C~ i> L,. The equilibrium policy will be: x = A for L m <~ A <~ max{L,, Cr(Lr)}, or x = 
max{L,, Cr(Lr) } for a > max{L,, Cr(Lr) }. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. See Proposition 1. For x/> L,~, three cases need to be distin- 
guished: 
(a) If C r < L,  as before, the gatekeeper will keep its gates closed; 
(b) If Ci ~< L~ <~ C,, the committee cannot form a qualified majority in favor of x given 
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y, since Psc(y) = (0 and P~(y) = ~. Consequently, the committee will only keep its 
gates closed when x ~ M: 
(c) If Ct > L,, Ct is the decisive committee member. Now, the committee will not open 
its gates when x ~ Rct(Lr). 
The Commission selects its best x such that the gatekeeper does not open its gates. The 
set of points that satisfy this condition is equivalent to [L~, Lr] for Cl< L,, or [L,~, Cl(Lr)] 
for Ct/> L,. The equil ibrium policy will be: x -- A for L m ~ A <<- max{L,, Cl(Lr)}, or x = 
max{L, G(Lr)} for a > max{L,, Cl(Lr) }. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. For q t> L,, see Proposition 2. The Council will not veto the 
Commission proposal x since L m prefers y = x for x <~ L r or y = L r for x > L,. For q < Lr 
and q/> L~, the set of proposals that will not be vetoed is [Lm, q]. Now, three cases need 
to be distinguished: 
(a) If Cr < q, the gatekeeper weakly prefers proposals in RE(q) = [Cr(q),q). However, 
these proposals are also veto-proof proposals, i.e., will be accepted by the Council, 
so the gatekeeper will keep its gates closed; 
(b) If Cz <~ q ~ C,, R~(q) = (~ and R~:(q) = ~, so the committee cannot form a qualified 
majority in favor of x given q. The committee will only keep its gates closed when x 
is veto-proof, that is, x ~ q; 
(c) If Cl> q, R~:(q) ~ 9). C~is the decisive committee member. Now, the committee will 
not open its gates when x ~ Rc~(q), which is equivalent to (q, Cl(q)]. 
The Commission selects its best x such that the gatekeeper does not open its gates. The 
set of points that satisfy this condition is equivalent to [Lm, q] for Ct ~< q, or [L~ Ct(q)] 
for Ct > q. The equil ibrium policy will be: x = A for L,, ~< A ~< max{Ct(q),q}, or x = 
max{Cl(q),q} for a > max{Ct(q),q}. 
Similarly, the solutions for q ~< Lm, and therefore Lm(q) > L , ,  can be derived. 
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